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The EU exercised an extensive political authority towards the candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) during the 2004 enlargement negotiations period: a strict 
pre-accession conditionality was applied to ensure the alignment of the candidate countries’ 
legislation and institutions with the complex body of EU legislation prior to the accession. In 
many respects the application of such strict and structured pre-accession conditionality was 
unique in the history of the EU enlargement. In its last annual monitoring report, the European 
Commission optimistically noted that ‘in most areas of the acquis, preparations for the 
membership have been virtually completed [by the end of September 2003] They have reached 
a very high degree of alignment, and generally deserve to be commended for these 
achievements’ (European Commission 2003, 23). The general consensus in the literature is that 
the EU was generally effective in promoting domestic reforms, and prompting the transposition 
of the EU law into candidate countries’ legislative and institutional frameworks. However, 
there are well justified doubts whether the success of the EU membership conditionality can be 
achieved after the accession. In other words, it has been widely anticipated that the EU political 
authority and ability to elicit compliance with its rules in the post-accession period would be 
more limited than in the pre-accession period. Given that the main positive incentive of 
membership was already granted and the EU capacities to sanction its member states’ non-
compliance practices are quite limited, the new member states from Central and Eastern 
Europe would be quite prone to violating the EU law.  
The scepticism and caution expressed in the academic circles regarding the continuity 
and effectiveness of the EU post-accession conditionality in the CEE states has been largely 
echoed by the EU itself and other international institutions. In anticipation of post-accession 
difficulties to transpose and, mainly, implement the EU general acquis, which consists of more 
than 80,000 pages of legislation (Toshkov 2008, 380), as well as the specific ‘enlargement 
acquis’, the EU created specific sanctions and safeguards in the context of the 2004 eastern 
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enlargement. According to Articles 38 and 39 of the Accession Treaty signed in April 2003, 
during the first three years of membership, the European Commission can take the following 
measures if new member-states fail to apply the acquis properly: temporary exclusion of a non-
compliant new member-state from some benefits of the single market and other benefits of 
membership in certain policy areas. Influenced by the ‘enlargement fatigue’, the current 
Barroso Commission adopted a much stricter approach towards implementation of political 
conditionality, allowing for new formal procedures to suspend accession negotiations at each 
stage if pre-accession compliance is not satisfactory. A widely held view inside the European 
Commission in the immediate aftermath of the eastern enlargement was that of self-criticism in 
terms of the Commission’s approach during the 2004 accession process, which had been too 
naïve and not sufficiently strict about matters of enforcement and implementation of the EU 
rules (Pridham 2008, 366).  A study in 2004, the actual year of ‘Eastern Enlargement’, by the 
EU and the OECD found that administrative standards in the region were not up to Western 
standards: among the most frequently reported problems were patronage, low pay, 
discretionary power of senior civil servants, and rising levels of corruption (The Economist 
2006). Two years later, in 2006, the World Bank reported that administrative and civil service 
reforms in the EU-8 (new EU member states of the CEE), rapidly pushed through during the 
pre-accession period, had ran into ground and had been quite limited in terms of 
institutionalisation and implementation (World Bank 2006). Widely reported in the media, the 
most controversial case of policy reversal concerned the issue of increased political control of 
the civil service in countries of CEE. In June and October 2006 Slovakia and Poland, 
respectively, amended their pre-accession laws on civil service by abolishing the newly created 
Civil Service Authorities, which made it easier for politicians in both countries to control the 
civil service. Moreover, even those countries in the region that were traditionally regarded as 
‘enlargement over-achievers’ in terms of their compliance with the enlargement acquis, have 
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also backslided in the post-accession reform process. Thus, the government of the Czech 
Republic has repeatedly delayed adoption of a law to regulate the appointment of civil 
servants, and was largely unsuccessful in the implementation of civil service reform in the 
country (The Economist 2006). The cases of reform delay and backsliding are evident in other 
policy areas as well. In April 2006 the Polish government was severely criticised by the EU (in 
particular, by the European Parliament) over a range of social value issues including the 
proposed death penalty for paedophiles and intolerant policies towards sexual minorities.  
Notwithstanding these clear-cut cases of policy reversal, however, the European 
Commission’s own monitoring system does not identify a distinctive ‘Eastern’ compliance 
problem: the formal compliance record of the new member states, as registered in the 
Commission’s infringement statistics, is on average better than that of the EU-15 (Sedelmeier 
2008, 811-816). Such positive compliance record also applies to the domestic transposition of 
EU legislation as well as faster settlement of infringement cases in comparison to the old 
member states. In the period from 2004 to 2007 the mean transposition deficit in the new 
member states (EU-10) was lower than the average percentage of non-transposed directives in 
the EU-15 (Toshkov 2008, 380). Moreover, in 2007 the best-performing countries are new 
member states and the worst country-performer in the EU-10 still had a better compliance 
record than the worst performer in EU-15 (ibid.). A surprisingly good performance of the 
newly accessed EU-10 represents an interesting puzzle. Why is there such a discrepancy in 
compliance records across countries of CEE and policy issues?  
A possible answer to this question, already discussed to a certain extent in the literature 
on Europeanization and compliance with EU rules, can be problems with the monitoring data 
provided by the Commission itself. It could well be that due to various reasons, including 
logistics and a lack of resources to closely monitor the compliance on the ground, the 
Commission data simply does not give an accurate picture of the true situation with 
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compliance in the new member states (Falkner, Treib and Holzleithner 2008; Hartlapp and 
Falkner 2009). Another plausible explanation to such mixed record of compliance could be 
found if one adopts a more nuanced understanding of the key variable of interest – compliance 
with EU rules. Thus, if compliance is viewed as merely formal transposition of EU laws into 
domestic laws, taking into account the legislative stage only, then it is quite possible that there 
is no distinct ‘Eastern problem’. However, if one operationalises ‘compliance’ as both formal 
transposition and practical implementation of EU rules, then the policy backsliding in 
individual issue-cases does not seem to be as puzzling as before. As suggested by one study, 
‘the world of dead letters’ rules in some new member states, meaning that a fairly decent 
transposition of formal EU rules is followed by a neglect of practical implementation (Falkner 
et al. 2005).  
Given a mixed evidence of new member states’ compliance record and a pessimistic 
outlook regarding reduced leverage of EU conditionality after the accession, it is reasonable to 
specify and ‘fine-tune’ further the analysis at both empirical and theoretical levels. Are such 
episodes of policy reversal and implementation failure a reflection of a general pattern of 
democratic backslide given the fragility of democratic systems and a generally weak state 
framework in countries of CEE? Or do these episodes represent mere exceptions and have been 
unfairly over-reported by the media? Is the EU political authority vis-à-vis new member states 
of CEE more limited in the post-accession period? If yes, what can explain such differentiated 
impact of post-accession conditionality? Why do some policy areas show more problematic 
post-accession compliance than others? More generally, how different is the dynamics in 
relations between the new member states of CEE and the EU compared to the enlargement 
negotiation process?  
The main aim of this paper is to provide tentative answers to some of these questions 
through detailed intra-case comparative analysis of the compliance record across two policy 
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issues in a new EU member states – Slovakia. The paper adopts a recently suggested in the 
literature analytical framework (Steunenberg 2006, Meyer-Sahling 2006, Dimitrova 2007 and 
2010) that focuses on the preferences of key issue-specific veto-players and non-state actors 
bargaining over adoption of formal rules and their institutionalisation in the new EU member 
states. The framework is, thus, used to explain divergent patterns of institutionalization and 
formal rules’ adoption in the new member states during the post-enlargement period. Slovakia 
is a particularly interesting country-case to focus on. It commenced official accession 
negotiations in early 2000 and entered the EU in May 2004 along with the other seven CEE 
countries plus Malta and Cyprus. However, Slovakia’s path towards opening the official 
negotiations with EU was a winding one as in the 1990s the country experienced serious 
violations of democratic standards under the Mečiar government, which caused criticism in the 
EU circles and led to delay in opening membership talks in 1997 on political grounds. The 
1998 elections brought new political parties into a centre-left coalition government, which 
changed domestic configurations of main actors and their relative bargaining power, and made 
them more responsive to the EU hard political conditionality. As a result, the country made a 
huge leap forward in its journey to the EU and was able to start the membership talks in 2000 
together with the ‘front-runner’ candidates such as Slovenia and the Czech Republic. 
Therefore, the analysis of a new member state with relatively difficult background represents a 
‘hard case’ for the impact of the EU political conditionality prior to accession and post-
accession compliance with EU rules, which may also have a wider meaning for the wider CEE 
region, EU-7. The two specific policy areas under consideration are the minority policy, a part 
of imported non-acquis rules (but known as the EU ‘enlargement acquis’), and the social 
policy (with particular emphasis on the employment equality provisions), a part of the official 
EU acquis communauitaire. The rationale for selecting these two policy areas stems from the 
idea, already expressed in some studies, that variation in the post-accession compliance record 
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can be accounted for by the nature of imported EU rules: non-acquis rules can be reversed 
domestically at relatively low cost than the acquis rules, which are part of the European 
Commission’s monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (Dimitrova 2008 and 2010; 
Sedelmeier 2006 and 2008). Therefore, these two diverse policy areas add important variation 
to the data on post-accession compliance record in Slovakia. The next section discusses briefly 
the current theoretical approaches advanced in the literature on pre- and post-accession 
compliance of the new member states of CEE. This is followed by detailed case studies of the 
two policy areas – the minority policy and the social policy. At the end of the paper, 





Pre- and post-accession compliance: theoretical considerations 
 
Our knowledge of the effects of EU conditionality on domestic political reform during 
pre-accession negotiations between the states of CEE and the EU has improved significantly 
due to a burgeoning literature on the subject (Haughton 2007).  One of the most interesting 
contributions of the literature on the EU pre-accession conditionality is a sophisticated and 
nuanced conceptualisation of how exactly external and internal factors interact when external 
actors attempt to export their norms and rules to a target state. Two broader theoretical 
approaches, rationalist institutionalism and sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism, 
have been particularly useful in teasing out the exact mechanisms of rule transfer from the EU 
to a candidate state during the pre-accession phase.  
In brief, rationalist institutionalism suggests the candidate states’ compliance with the EU 
conditionality can be explained by applying the ‘rational actor’ model of politics. The EU 
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impact was based less on normative persuasion and democratic socialisation of domestic 
political elites, but on offering ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in order to compel a candidate state to 
adopt a certain policy. Thus, the effects of EU conditionality “correspond with a rationalist 
set of assumptions that define domestic actors as cost-benefit-calculating, utility-
maximising actors” (Kelley 2004a, 428). As in all rationalist theory, expected individual 
costs and benefits determine domestic actors’ preferences regarding whether to comply with 
conditions applied by an external actor. Domestic actors tend to favour such a relationship 
with external actors that would maximise their net benefits. As Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier specify with regard to the 2004 eastern enlargement, ‘a member state favours 
the integration of an outsider state – and an outsider seeks to expand its institutional ties 
with the organization – under the conditions that it will reap positive net benefits from 
enlargement’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, 12). Rationalist institutionalists 
conceptualise the EU’s domestic impact as following a ‘logic of consequences’ rather than a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989, 160). Actors participate in processes of 
strategic interaction on the basis of their given identities and interests and try to realise their 
preferences through strategic behaviour (Risse 2000, 3). Following the logic of 
consequences, domestic actors comply with conditionality because they want to maximise 
their individual utility and decrease the costs of non-compliance. Similarly, external actors 
do not try to socialise and convince target states to adopt certain policies, but rather they 
choose to ‘bargain’ with them by means of various incentives and disincentives (or threats 
and promises). Thus, in the CEE context adaptational pressure from the EU changes the 
opportunity structures for utility-maximising domestic actors. It empowers certain domestic 
actors by offering legal and political resources to pursue domestic change, which turns 
formal domestic institutions and veto-players into main factors impeding or facilitating 
changes in response to the EU accession conditionality (Sedelmeier 2011, 11).  
By contrast, sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism posits that domestic responses 
follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’. Domestic actors respond to EU conditions and follow 
democratic norms for intrinsic reasons, that is ‘based on personal dispositions informed by 
social beliefs, they do what is deemed appropriate in a given situation and given their social 
role’ (Schimmelfennig 2002, 12). External actors, too, follow the logic of appropriateness 
when teaching and persuading target states to comply with democratic norms. In this regard, 
both sets of actors, external actors and domestic actors, ‘try to “do the right thing” rather 
than maximising or optimising their given preferences’ (Risse 2000, 4). The EU’s domestic 
impact results from a process of socialisation in which domestic actors internalise EU rules 
and norms that they regard as legitimate. Socialisation can be seen here as “the process by 
which principled ideas held by individuals become norms in the sense of collective 
understandings about appropriate behaviour which then lead to changes in identities, 
interests, and behaviour” (Risse et al. 1999, 11). Thus, for a ‘socialisee’ (Flockhart 2005, 
15) the socialisation process means to adopt and internalise an externally imposed rule or 
norm to such an extent that external pressure is no longer needed to ensure compliance 
(ibid.). Such complex process of norm adoption and internalisation takes place primarily at 
the level of socialisees and is usually presented in the literature as a process of ‘social 
learning’ (ibid.). As for ‘socialisers’ (ibid.), the aim of the socialisation process is to 
persuade, and sometimes even pressure, domestic actors to accept their norms and to adhere 
to norm-compliant behaviour. This is done solely on the basis of norms, without resorting to 
exogenous material manipulation. In addition, a number of enabling conditions should exist 
in order for domestic actors to engage in a social learning process through which the EU 
rules shape domestic actors’ interests and identities: among such conditions are minimal 
domestic opposition to imported rules and a closer cultural match between EU rules and 
domestic formal and informal institutions.  
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It is noteworthy at this point that, although the two approaches emphasize analytically 
different mechanisms of EU rule transfer, these are complementary and not necessarily 
mutually exclusive (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Kelley 2004a and 2004b). As 
Kelley points out, in the area of minority policy the EU never relied exclusively on 
conditionality: it was always combined with normative pressures of international institutions 
(Kelley 2004a). However, there is a certain consensus in the literature that the main 
mechanism that accounted for adoption of EU rules during pre-accession was the powerful 
external incentive of membership which strengthened the effects of EU conditionality, 
rather than alternative mechanism of social learning and socialisation (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Dimitrova 2004; Grabbe 2006). In other words, socialisation mechanisms 
were complementary in influencing the domestic actors’ preferences and opportunity 
structures, whereas the conditionality mechanism was crucial in enticing domestic actors to 
comply with EU conditionality.  
The accession of eight CEE states into the EU in May 2004 sparked a new interest among 
scholars of both EU compliance studies and the Europeanization literature. The EU’s 
involvement in domestic politics of CEE candidate countries was extraordinary, but it has 
become far from clear whether such strong leverage would prove sustainable in the post-
accession stage. There are a lot of reasons to be sceptical about post-accession compliance 
trends in CEE. The sheer number of formally transposed EU rules during pre-accession 
represents a Herculean task for domestic governments to effectively oversee their practical 
application. This is aggravated further by structural and resource weakness of national 
administrations as well as generally weak state apparatus in post-communist democracies of 
CEE. Scholars working within both the rationalist and the constructivist theoretical 
approaches share the generally negative expectation that the dominance of conditional 
incentives as the main mechanism of EU rule transfer during pre-accession will create 
unfavourable conditions for post-accession compliance. However, they differ in ‘their 
particular views about why this should be the case, and accordingly also on how compliance 
problems can be avoided or overcome’ (Sedelmeier 2006, 147). For the rationalists the key 
explanatory factor for such negative assessment is the changed incentive structure for 
domestic actors after accession (Goetz 2005; Malova and Haughton 2006; Sedelmeier 2006, 
2008 and 2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The key question here is, thus, 
whether the punishment mechanisms entailed in the EU’s compliance system will be able to 
compensate for the absence of conditional incentives once the new member states ‘arrived 
in the safe heaven of “Brussels” (Goetz 2005, 273). As Sedelmeier points out, the prospects 
are then particularly ‘daunting for the rules of the so-called “enlargement acquis”, such as 
minority rights, which were included in the EU’s accession conditionality, but which the EU 
institutions have no power to patrol vis-à-vis full members’ (Sedelmeier 2006, 147).  
The constructivists are also doubtful about the positive prospects of post-accession 
compliance. The key point here is that rules hastily transferred under the conditional 
incentive of EU membership are unlikely to take proper hold with domestic political elites 
and be perceived as legitimate, especially in highly contentious policy issues that had led to 
considerable domestic opposition during pre-accession. At the same time, however, it is 
plausible that the processes of social learning and identification due to longer time-frame of 
their effects will actually take place in the post-accession stage: ‘rather than creating a 
backlash against legitimacy problems of the process, the experience of conditionality may 
have socialised the EU8 into perceiving good compliance as appropriate behaviour for good 
community members’ (Sedelmeier 2008, 821). A number of other ‘optimistic’ scenarios 
suggested by some constructivists include continuation of post-accession compliance as new 
rules become ‘sticky’ due to habit and a ‘status quo bias’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
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2005, 227-8; Kelley 2004a, 192); the EU rules’ empowerment effects through induction of 
domestic actors into new working norms in conformance with European standards and 
expertise (Börzel 2005, 52); and the ‘locking-in’ effect of the Europeanization processes on 
new member states (Grabbe 2006). Generally, it seems that the rationalist approaches are 
more sceptical about the positive prospects of post-accession compliance among new 
member states, and the constructivists tend to have more optimistic expectations. However, 
it is quite possible that the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive given the specificity of 
the post-2004 EU context and domestic political contexts of the new member states. As 
Pridham correctly notes, ‘there may be conflicting pressures in both directions [compliance 
and non-compliance] or because the various political conditions present different 
implementation problems or simply because [new member states] may be selective about 
backtracking over the conditions’ (Pridham 2008, 370).  
The emerging research on post-accession compliance among member states has identified 
another important area which is worthwhile considering in detail: the type of EU rules being 
transposed and implemented in post-accession period (Sedelmeier 2006, Dimitrova 2007 
and 2010; Sadurski et al. 2006). The argument here is that the national governments’ 
willingness to comply with EU rules depends on whether the EU possesses concrete 
enforcement mechanisms such as material and social sanctions. In this regard, the prospects 
of post-accession compliance are particularly unfavourable for the so called ‘enlargement 
acquis’, which contained a number of requirements for introducing international democratic 
norms and horizontal institutional reform, such as ethnic minority rights and 
democratisation of domestic political systems. The rules and legislation related to 
democracy and human rights protection, which originated in the Council of Europe and its 
major international conventions, were later incorporated by the EU and included into 
Copenhagen enlargement criteria. These conditions did not focus on a specific policy issue, 
but required creation of a general institutional framework conducive to consolidation of 
democracy and economic development as well as facilitating effective functioning of EU 
policies domestically. The ‘enlargement acquis’, thus, should not be confused with the EU 
official acquis communautaire, an extensive body of EU rules and regulations on specific 
policy areas and administrative processes that should be adopted and applied by all existing 
member states. In this regard, the variation in post-accession compliance outcomes of non-
acquis rules is potentially larger than in the case of EU formal acquis rules (Dimitrova 
2010, 145). The fact that the European Commission does not have specific monitoring and 
punishment mechanisms in non-acquis areas, makes the latter more susceptible to irregular 
compliance, incomplete implementation and even violation on the part of EU-8 national 
governments. This is largely because rules which are part of the EU acquis, hence, would be 
more costly to reverse, whereas the non-acquis rules can be reversed at relatively little cost 
(Sedelmeier 2006, Dimitrova 2007 and 2010). By examining Slovakia’s compliance record 
in one acquis policy area (social and employment policy) and one non-acquis set of rules 
(minority policy), this paper aims to investigate this theoretical claim in more detail in the 
next two sections. 
Before concluding this part of the paper, an important issue of institutionalisation and 
implementation of EU rules in practice should be briefly touched upon. It has been correctly 
argued that the absence of the so called ‘Eastern problem’ of compliance does not reflect 
properly the reality of domestic transposition and application of EU rules partly due to 
irregularities of the compliance data generated by the Commission itself, and partly due to 
discrepancy between formal rule adoption and real institutional and policy changes on the 
ground (Falkner 2010; Dimitrova 2007 and 2010; Sedelmeier 2008; Hartlapp and Falkner 
2009; Schimmelfennig and Trauner (eds) 2009). In other words, the good record of 
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compliance of EU-8 is more like a myth: the imported EU rules remain merely ‘empty 
shells’ (Dimitrova 2010) or ‘dead letters’ (Falkner et al. 2008), and rarely lead to proper 
behavioural changes by the domestic actors. To examine whether this is the case and to 
explain dynamics behind formal rule adoption and implementation, Dimitrova develops a 
useful theoretical framework that this paper intends to closely follow when analysing the 
case of Slovakia (Dimitrova 2010). The process of institutionalisation is viewed as a crucial 
part of implementation: a process whereby a new formal rule (e.g. EU employment equality 
directive) is supported by supplementary informal rules (everyday political practices and 
informal networks in the context of post-communist weak states) and both become the new 
rules-in-use (ibid., 138). Institutionalisation, for instance, may involve creation of 
supporting or supplementing rules. The supporting rules may be formal, such as secondary 
legislation adopted to facilitate application of the EU transposed legislation, or informal, 
such as action plans, strategies or manuals used by the national government to ensure post-
accession compliance. The division into formal and informal practices and rules is 
particularly applicable to the post-communist context of ‘weak state, strong actors’ (ibid. 
143) in CEE, where inherent weakness of public authority and administrative apparatus is 
combined with relative strength of individual political actors as well as non-state actors and 
informal networks (Ganev 2007; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Crucially, the process of rule 
institutionalization and implementation is seen through the lens of political bargaining: in 
other words, different outcomes in the institutionalisation of EU formal rules would be 
determined by the competition of actors that bargain over institutions and imported formal 
rules in a weak state environment (Dimitrova 2010, 144). The most relevant actors 
participating in this bargaining include politicians and members of the government, as well 
as non-state actors such as business groups, oligarchs and NGOs (Grzymala-Busse and 
Luong 2002; Steunenberg 2006; Dimitrova 2010). All these actors can be potentially 
regarded as veto-players (Tsebelis 2002) which occupy a certain position in the formal 
configuration of the political system and are influenced by formal and informal practices.  
Drawing on the theoretical considerations about post-accession compliance presented above 
and, particularly, on Dimitrova’s theoretical framework, the following three possible 
outcomes of Slovakia’s post-accession compliance can be put forward: 1. reversal of new 
rules; 2. implementation and institutionalisation (formal and informal rules align); 3. ‘empty 
shells’ or ‘dead letters’ (actors ignore formal rules, parallel informal rules are used). To 
specify these expectations further, the three working hypotheses are as follows: 
1. For EU acquis formal rules the most likely outcomes are implementation or 
‘empty shells’. (1A. When veto-players’ preferences are in opposition to EU 
acquis rules, two sets of rules will be used in parallel – formal and informal, 
which leads to an ‘empty shells’ outcome).  
2. For EU non-acquis rules, reversal or institutionalisation are equally possible 
as outcomes. (2A. When adopted non-acquis rules are opposed by veto 
players, they will be reversed). 
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3. If veto-players’ preferences are matched with the new rules, the formal and 
informal rules would align and the likely outcome is implementation (and 
institutionalisation).  
 
The next part of the paper applies the theoretical approach outlined above by examining 
Slovakia’s post-accession compliance in one of the EU acquis areas – social policy; and one 
EU non-acquis area – minority policy.  
 
Protecting minorities in post-accession Slovakia: challenges of institutionalisation and 
implementation 
 
The case of the minority policy in Slovakia is an interesting one as it presents a ‘hard 
case’ for testing the effectiveness and impact of EU conditionality in the post-accession period. 
First, there is some variation in status and rights of the two largest minorities in the country: 
the largest minority group, 10.7 % of ethnic Hungarians, occupies a relatively stronger position 
in the political system than the Roma minority of 1.8 % (data from the 2001 Census figures). 
Thus, there is a need to explore in detail whether this variation is due to different cultural 
attitudes and socio-economic conditions, or due to differences in political leverage on the part 
of these two minorities. Can one assume that the EU rules also played some role here in having 
the differentiated impact on promoting rights of both sets of minorities? Second, the norms for 
protection of ethnic minorities belong to the so called non-acquis EU rules which were 
extensively pushed for by the EU during the enlargement process. These rules and norms are 
not part of the EU official acquis communautaire, and are absent from the European 
Commission’s monitoring system of enforcement and sanctions in case of non-compliance. A 
lack of credible punishment mechanisms on the EU part, therefore, can potentially make this 
policy area more prone to non-compliance or, more likely, to patchy, incomplete and 
differentiated compliance on the domestic government’s part. Third, such pessimism can be 
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reinforced further if one takes into account Slovakia’s record in reforming the minority policy 
and, more generally, in compliance with EU political conditions during the 2004 enlargement 
process. Indeed, as one scholar puts it ‘in retrospect, relations between Slovakia and the EU 
have been the most difficult of any EU candidate state in the past’ (Brosig 2010, 398). The 
most ‘famous’ set-back in the country’s aspirations to join the enlargement negotiations 
process in the 1990s was the EU’s refusal to open official membership talks with Slovakia in 
1997, following a series of ‘naming and shaming’ sessions and démarches on the part of EU 
institutions after the then Mečiar government had adopted a number of undemocratic political 
reforms, including on the rights of minorities. This refusal had a sobering impact on domestic 
political groups, which were able to unite and consolidate its opposition against the Mečiar’s 
populist government, and won the 1998 elections forming a new centre-right government under 
the leadership of Mikulaš Dzurinda. The legacy of Mečiar’s anti-minority policies were a 
heavy burden for the incoming Dzurinda government: among the most controversial issue 
areas were significant delays in signing the treaty between Slovakia and Hungary and adopting 
a minority language law, a problematic penalty code, a highly restrictive State Language Law 
and the school certificate issue (Kelley 2004a and 2004b, Brosig 2010). The latter two issues 
have been explicitly referred to by the EU as important preconditions for starting accession 
negotiations, and indeed the government did not delay with reversal of the controversial 
legislative acts. In 1999 a new Law on the Use of Minority Languages was adopted, which 
specified conditions under which minority languages could be used in official communication. 
In the same year the parliament passed the education act amendment, which allowed for 
issuing of bilingual school-leaving certificates for students of primary and secondary schools.  
However, Slovakia’s big ‘leap forward’ in the negotiation process and a speedy 
adoption of the EU-requested legislation had harmful trade-offs in terms of the quality and 
implementation of the new legal provisions in practice. For instance, the 1999 Law on the Use 
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of Minority Languages did not contain specific requirements for public authorities to have a 
command of a minority language for ease of communication and the subsequent Commission’s 
progress reports on Slovakia did not mention this issue at all. This example shows the 
emphasis on formal rule adoption on the part of the EU, which in the medium-term adversely 
affected proper application of the law and incomplete guarantees of minority languages rights. 
In terms of minority rights for Roma, the Commission itself reported in 2000 that despite the 
Dzurinda government’s extensive efforts to tackle the ‘Roma problem’1, there was still a 
considerable ‘gap between the good intentions and their actual implementation as (…) practical 
improvement in the daily life of the minorities is very minor if not unnoticeable’ (European 
Commission 2000, as cited in Brosig 2010, 399). However, the EU itself is partly to blame for 
such discrepancy: the EU’s failure to establish concrete benchmarks for Roma integration 
projects which would allow measurement of progress and development of specific guidelines 
for improvement left applicant countries with the impression that EU membership could be 
achieved without substantial reforms on the Roma issue and their implementation (Sasse 2005, 
10).  
The case of the Roma minority rights illustrates one of the post-accession compliance 
scenarios outlined in the theoretical section of this paper – the ‘empty shell’ or ‘dead letters’ 
outcome. After EU entry, the Dzurinda government continued with institutionalisation of the 
adopted formal EU rules: the Roma question was now firmly established on the government’s 
agenda while the Roma Plenipotentiary’s Office had become fully operational with five 
regional branches. It also closely participated in the relevant transnational networks and was 
closely engaged with the European Parliament (Pridham 2008, 380). New EU money started to 
arrive through the Structural Funds, some of which were directed to financing various Roma-
                                                 
1
 The then government’s efforts in this policy area can be characterised as mostly institutional in nature: for 
instance, in 2001 the government established a specific position, a plenipotentiary for Roma issues, and developed 
the ‘Roma Strategy’ to help the Roma minority in such areas as housing, unemployment, discrimination and 
education.  
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related matters such as schools, roads, training and labour market promotion (ibid., 381). In 
May 2004 Slovakia adopted an Anti-Discrimination Act, transposing the EU Racial Equality 
Directive into national law on time within the given deadline. All of these measures show some 
encouraging tendencies on the government’s part to institutionalise EU formal rules adopted 
during pre-accession, and, in general, to engage more in a bottom-up manner rather than top-
down approached adopted during the accession period.  
However, despite all these efforts, the Roma issue still remains to be resolved at a 
deeper societal level as highlighted by clearly racial rhetoric of some political elites and the 
general public. For instance, the Prime Minister Fico has promised in his 2002 election 
campaign to tackle the ‘irresponsible growth of the Romani population’ (Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe 2006, as cited in Brosig 2010, 404). Various NGOs’ 
reports highlight the full extension of discrimination cases, such as forced sterilisation of Roma 
women in Slovak hospitals and intimidation of Roma victims by police officers to withdraw 
their witness statements from trials in progress. Neither the Dzurinda government, nor the Fico 
government took any concrete measures to investigate these allegations in detail (ibid.). 
Moreover, the supporting or supplementing institutional measures taken to facilitate timely and 
correct implementation of EU rules did not bring desirable results. For instance, despite the on-
time transposition of the EU Racial Equality Directive, the new legislation remained unused by 
Slovak courts for more than two years (Gallová-Kriglerová and Kadlečíková 2007, 199, as 
cited in Brosig 2010, 405). The established by the Anti-Discrimination Act the Slovak National 
Centre for Human Rights (SNCHR) has performed disappointingly as ‘up to spring 2007 only 
one Roma woman had obtained legal support from the centre’ (Brosig 2010, 406). Therefore, 
one may conclude that the implementation of the EU non-acquis rules in relation to rights of 
the Roma minority has been largely ineffective. Measures aimed at the institutionalisation of 
formal rules in order to bring them in alignment with informal rules and practices did not bring 
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any significant changes to the situation with Roma and the status quo of ‘empty shells’ (when 
political actors ignore the new rules, and parallel informal rules and practices are used) 
unfortunately prevailed.  
Conversely, the position of the Hungarian minority after EU entry has strengthened in 
comparison to continuing disenfranchisement and political disorganisation of the Roma 
minority. The main factors explaining such differences can be found in the domestic 
configuration and varying bargaining power of the main veto-players relevant to the EU non-
acquis rules on minority rights. The steady improvement in situation with Hungarians in the 
country owed much to the presence of the Hungarian political party SMK (Hungarian Coalition 
Party), which participated in coalition government for eight years between 1998 and 2006. In 
the 1998 elections the SMK received 9.12 % of the popular vote and won 15 seats in the 
national parliament. It was mainly due to pressure from the SMK, supported by the EU and 
other European organisations, that the government put the minority language issue on the 
agenda straight after the election and formation of the government (Kelley 2004, 132). After 
the 2002 elections, the SMK emerged as a stronger player as it was able to increase its seats 
share in the parliament from 15 in 1998 to 20 in 2002. As a result, it became the second largest 
coalition partner after the SKDU (Slovak Democratic Coalition and Christian Union), which 
obtained 28 seats, along with the minor two political parties (KDH and ANO) with 15 seats 
each.  Such dispersed configuration of political forces in the ruling coalition government 
allowed the SMK to push for additional legislation favouring Hungarian minority issues, 
further encouraged by the EU’s explicit support of the issue (Pridham 2008, 380). However, 
there were times (such as regional reform and the Hungarian status law according special rights 
to Hungarian minorities living abroad) when tensions arose between the SMK and its coalition 
partners. In effect, the SMK could not really do much as it found itself between the grindstones 
of two national leaderships of Slovakia and Hungary, each refusing to compromise on the issue 
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of the Hungarian Status Law. Both sides looked to them for resolution and they were ‘double-
hated’ by the Slovak nationalists for being ‘irredentist Hungarians’, as well as from the 
Hungarian government for being too passive (Kusá 2010, 17).  
The 2006 parliamentary elections brought a new left-leaning coalition government 
under the leadership of Robert Fico (the SMER party), which ended the SMK’s presence in 
power and it became an opposition party with 20 seats. The new coalition members under the 
Fico government took a less sympathetic stance on rights of the Hungarian national minority: 
the new government’s first months in power were marked by bitter polemics with the SMK and 
with Budapest, which helped to radicalize the SMK and somewhat politicise the issue 
(Pridham 2008, 380). Up until late 2008 the government was reluctant to undertake concrete 
measures on reversal of the previous legislative acts guaranteeing rights to the Hungarian 
minority apart from ‘less than friendly noises from the new Fico government from 2006’ 
(ibid.). However, situation has worsened considerably since 2009, when the Slovak parliament 
passed an amendment to the Law of the State Language, imposing fines for incorrect use of the 
Slovak language by institutions and tighter requirements for some official bodies such as the 
Post Office, the Army and the police forces to use the state language in all official 
communication. The law entered into force on 1 September 2009 and the fines have been 
implemented from 1 January 2010. This was the same law that had caused a harsh criticism in 
1995-1996 by the EU with regard to unfair elevation of the Slovak language over all other 
languages spoken in the country. The law was then amended in 1999, making the Slovak 
language policy more acceptable to the EU. The OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities Knut Vollbaek has criticised the amendment and called on the government to amend 
the Law on the languages of national minorities so that it could balance the restrictive Law on 
the State Language. The European Parliament issued a statement about the incompatibility of 
the amended law with European standards in national minority rights and the Vice Chairman of 
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the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee said that ‘the law de facto criminalises the use of 
minority languages in certain areas’ (‘Europe: the Language Law Discriminates’, 10 July 2009, 
as cited by Kusá 2010, 19). But, overall, the EU reaction to the controversial new amendment 
to the law was muted. Perhaps, this can be explained by the fact that the EU does not possess 
any credible punishment mechanisms in case of non-compliance in the minority policy area 
and has only one lever at its disposal – the ‘naming and shaming’, which is not sufficient to 
influence the government to change the policy. 
Thus, this particular issue case shows that there are hardly any ‘lock-in’ effects of 
Europeanisation and socialisation into democratic norms that scholars working in the 
constructivist perspective had predicted with regard to post-accession period. The 
government’s actions in the first two years after the accession were more or less in continuity 
with formal EU rules adopted prior to accession. There was no significant opposition on the 
part of the Dzurinda government in 1998-2006 regarding the rights of ethnic Hungarians in the 
country and a certain degree of institutionalisation of adopted formal rules took place. The 
configuration of domestic and relative bargaining power of the major veto-players, including 
the direct participation of the Hungarian minority party, the SMK, in the coalition government, 
also facilitated alignment of formal and informal rules on minority policy. But after the 2006 
elections new coalition government came to power, which explicitly opposed strengthening the 
status of the Hungarian minority in the country and with relative ease reversed the previous 
government’s minority policy measures. For instance, in May 2010 in retaliation to the 
Hungarian citizenship law the Slovak Citizenship Act was modified in such a way that if a 
Slovak citizen acquires the citizenship of another state ‘by an act of will’, that is neither by 
marriage nor by birth, the person will automatically lose the Slovak citizenship (Kusá 2010, 
EUDO Citizenship Project). Judging by the results of the most recent parliamentary elections 
in summer 2010, in which the SMK party failed to win parliamentary representation for the 
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first time since its inception in 1998, the situation seems to be far from favourable for reaching 
compromise on one of the most sensitive political issues in Slovakia, and indeed, in the 
neighbouring Hungary. Although the departure of Fico from power in June 2010 and the 
coming of a new Prime Minister, Iveta Radičová, who is generally seen as less prone to 
nationalistic rhetoric, might calm things down slightly in the near future.  
 
Protecting workers in post-accession Slovakia: effects of political bargaining and 
informal practices 
 
During the pre-accession stage of EU membership negotiations, the candidate countries 
from CEE had to transpose all the European legislation in force prior to accession: a daunting 
task if taking into account merely the volume of rules to be adopted (around 90,000 pages of 
EU legislation!) notwithstanding the more substantive issues of ensuring legislative alignment 
and compatibility with national legal frameworks.  EU acquis rules in the field of employment 
and social policy are usually seen by scholars of Europeanisation and EU compliance among 
the most significant parts of EU formal rules that had been transposed during the pre-accession 
stage (Toshkov 2007 and 2008; Falkner and Treib 2008; Sedelmeier 2009; Leiber 2007; 
Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009). Firstly, it includes a relatively large number of directives 
adopted during the last two decades and covering a range of diverse issues such as racial anti-
discrimination and protection of workers from chemical hazards. Secondly and most 
importantly, the social policy and workers’ rights represent a highly salient topic in both 
society and the political establishment in countries of CEE, meaning that the stakes of the 
political game and decision-making on issues in the area are quite high. The social policy is 
also a policy domain where clear ideological differences come to play: the leftist and the 
rightist parties, as well as more liberally or more conservatively oriented parties have clearly 
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divergent preferences with regard to the overall direction of the policy (Toskov 2007, 336). 
Thus, the configuration of domestic political forces, their preferences and relative bargaining 
power in relation to each other can be particularly informative when analysing the outcomes of 
post-accession compliance in this policy area.  
Looking briefly at Slovakia’s pre-accession compliance record in the field of social 
policy, it should be noted that despite the setback of delayed opening of the official 
membership talks due to controversial ‘Mečiarism’ era in government, Slovakia took a 
relatively short time to close the social policy chapter – up to five months. In comparison, the 
‘enlargement front-runners’ in terms of compliance – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
– took more than a year and a half to transpose EU rules into national legislation. Moreover, 
Slovakia did not apply for any transitional periods aimed at gradual compliance. In 
comparison, Latvia and Slovenia applied and were granted three and one, respectively, 
transitional periods in the area of working conditions (ibid., 341). This is an interesting 
observation as it is plausible that for Slovakia, which at the time was keen to catch up and 
improve its image in the EU circles as a country capable to reform in conformance with the EU 
conditionality, such speedy transposition could be a ‘rushed business’ because it had 
significantly less time to develop proper negotiating position and set up the necessary 
institutional framework for effective implementation.  
Overall, Slovakia’s post-accession compliance in the field of social policy is consistent 
with scholarly findings about the absence of the so called ‘Eastern compliance problem’ 
(Sedelmeier 2006, 2008, and 2009; Leiber 2007; Falkner et al. 2008). Comparisons of pre-
accession adjustments and post-accession compliance trends in CEE do not find much 
evidence of deterioration in the area of the social policy and, in general, there were no more 
significant transposition problems in the new member states in comparison to the old member 
states (Sedelmeier 2011, 26). On the contrary, the performance of the EU-15 in transposing six 
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labour-law directives was far worse with ‘not even one-third of all cases (…) transposed 
“almost on time” and “essentially correctly”’ (Falkner et al. 2005, 267, as cited in Falkner 
2010, 103). At the same time, however, well-justified doubts about the degree of enforcement 
and implementation of imported EU acquis rules in the new member states of CEE have 
already arisen in the literature on post-accession compliance (Kühn 2005; Falkner and Treib 
2008; Falkner et al. 2008; Maniokas 2009; Krizsan 2009). As one detailed qualitative study of 
the implementation of directives on working time and non-discrimination in four countries of 
CEE reveals, there is a significant gap between the good legislative record and formal 
transposition of the EU acquis, which in itself represents a distinctive ‘world of compliance’ – 
a ‘world of dead letters’ (Falkner and Treib 2008; Falkner et al. 2008). In such a ‘world of dead 
letters’ the transposition processes are politicised, and application and enforcement problems 
are systematic even if a rule was formally transposed without significant problems.  
The application of the EU law is de-centralised and delegated to the member states: 
hence, the state is responsible for effective law enforcement. In this regard, the most important 
state institutions in ensuring practical application and enforcement of the EU law are the courts 
and other instances of the legal system, as well as administrative enforcement bodies such as 
labour inspectorates and equal treatment authorities. On a closer look, the EU formal rules on 
social policy, and especially, employment rights, have been transposed inadequately in 
Slovakia. There are a lot of ‘loopholes’ and unspecified provisions in the national legislation 
that leave a lot of room for manoeuvre for employers. For instance, the Labour Code, adopted 
in 2001 and amended in 2003, allows work contracts under commercial law, which can be seen 
as a legal ‘escape route’ depriving employees of proper protection under the labour law 
(Barancová 2006). Some employers even encourage potential employees to register as self-
employed so that they won’t be covered by the Labour Code (Schulze 2008, 113-14). The 
Code also fails to regulate efficiently the working time: it actually provides employers and 
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employees with unlimited possibilities of work resulting in Slovakia being a ‘leader’ in the 
extent of overtime hours (ibid.) The Code creates inadequately large legal space allowing a 
relatively great extent of overtime work not to be counted in the annual limit of overtime work. 
In addition, the pre-conditions for effective implementation of EU social policy rules are quite 
weak. The scarcity of resources and administrative weakness are among the most frequently 
reported problems of the Slovak judiciary (Fialová 2005, 152; Schulze 2008, 117). For 
instance, because of a lack of labour courts, most of disputes between employees and 
employers are settled in specialised civil courts. This means that judges are not qualified to 
deal specifically with labour-related law, and are not very familiar with EU-derived law and 
specialised legislation such anti-discrimination provisions (Schulze 2008, 117).  
In terms of degree of institutionalisation of EU formal rules on social policy the 
situation is similar. After EU accession the number of labour inspectorates, the main body 
responsible for enforcement and monitoring of employment provisions, has been steadily 
declining, with further reductions likely (ibid.). The quality of labour inspectorates’ work is 
also quite low: the inspectorates are usually seen as having much closer relations with 
employers than employees, and they rarely close down a business if necessary or impose 
sizeable fines (ibid., 118). Other institutions established to promote employment rights are not 
very effective either: for instance, the Slovak Centre for Human Rights, the institution 
established by the authorities to serve as an Equal Opportunities Body according to the relevant 
EU directive, has an extremely wide range of competences which is undesirable given the 
scarcity of financial resources allocated to the Centre.  
Thus, this brief overview of enforcement and implementation of EU social policy and 
employment directives in Slovakia shows that post-accession compliance with EU rules have 
been insufficient and problematic. It seems that leverage of EU conditionality diminished with 
Slovakia’s entry to the EU, and even the existing enforcement and monitoring mechanisms 
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applied by the European Commission are not sufficient to bring proper enforcement of EU 
formal rules. It seems that the ‘empty shells’ outcome – when the new rules are formally 
adopted but largely ignored in practice – is prevalent here. In the theoretical part of the paper it 
was expected that this outcome is most likely if the preferences of the main veto-players are in 
opposition to the new imported rules. On a closer look at the domestic configuration of 
political forces as well as their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis each other, this expectation 
is largely confirmed. First, the government’s composition and ideological position are 
worthwhile examining in detail. Since 2002, when the centre-right governing coalition was 
formed, Slovakia started to gradually turn towards neoliberalism (Fisher et al. 2007). The main 
neoliberal idea of the economic rationality of market coordination over state coordination of 
economic behaviour has been gradually introduced by the Dzurinda government in many areas 
such as fiscal policy and taxation, the labour code, the pension system, welfare payments, etc. 
Neoliberals in Slovakia’s 2002-06 government brought significant changes to labour market 
policies such as controversial amendments to the Labour Code (discussed earlier); abolishment 
of the Tripartite Act in autumn 2004, thus reducing trade unions’ and employees organisations’ 
privileged status in negotiations with the government and employers; and introduction of a 
more flexible labour market at the expense of employees’ rights. All of these measures were 
passed with relative ease in the national parliament, and were not returned to the government 
for amendments or re-drafting. Obviously, the ruling centre-right coalition was robust enough 
to vote consistently on these issues. Also, despite the fact that these moves produced bouts of 
discontent from the trade unions, weak leadership and internal divisions limited the power of 
the unions to prevent changes (Malová and Rybář 2005). Trade union density has declined in 
Slovakia over the last 10 years. In 2003, union density was 27%, but it had decreased to 20% 
by 2007 (EIROnline, ‘Slovakia’, report). Thus, the trade-unions did not possess sufficient 
bargaining power in the then government to change the controversial provisions. Moreover, the 
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government’s neo-liberal employment policies were largely backed and pushed for by informal 
networks and interest groups such as journalists, economic think-tanks, economic/business 
community especially those affiliated with banking institutions (Fisher et al. 2007, 990-96). 
The government’s success to push through controversial reforms was further facilitated by the 
weak and divided leftist parliamentary opposition and the under-institutionalisation of the party 
system (Malová and Haughton 2006, O’Dwyer and Kovalčík 2007). In particular, the left-wing 
party, the SDL (Party of the Democratic Left) has split in 1999 and led to emergence of a new 
party, SMER under the leadership of Robert Fico. The SDL itself split again in 2002 due to 
internal tensions.  
The left-oriented government of Robert Fico that came to power after the 2006 
elections, somewhat surprisingly and despite some pre-election pledges, maintained continuity 
in the country’s overall economic direction. Under the mounting pressure from the major trade-
unions, the government agreed to significantly amend the Labour Code in favour of the 
workers’ rights introducing a staggering number of new provisions – more than 150! The most 
important amendments related to employment contracts, working time and employee 
representatives. Although the majority of changes proposed by the government were approved, 
some proposals were not accepted or were adopted in milder versions by the parliament (Sziria 
2007). Overall, the Fico government has been forced to maintain continuity and not to sway 
much from the country’s ‘neo-liberal path’ due to limitations set by the international currency 
traders and other investors, and due to the pressure to join the single currency by the business 
lobby, including key financial backers of Fico’s party (Haughton and Malová 2007). It seems 
that the imported EU rules on social policy did not ‘fit’ with the most powerful players’ 






This paper attempted to explore the post-accession trends in compliance with EU 
acquis and non-acquis rules in Slovakia. The focus was purposefully narrowed down to two 
important policy areas: the national minority policy (part of EU pre-accession ‘enlargement 
acquis’) and the social policy (part of EU formal acquis communautaire). The paper also 
presents a ‘plausibility probe’ of the novel theoretical approaches, emerged recently in the 
compliance and Europeanisation literature, on the main factors that can explain behavioural 
non-compliance and the implementation deficit of EU formal rules in the new member states of 
CEE. EU pre-accession conditionality was concentrated mainly on the formal adoption of rules 
and standards and not on the full implementation and institutionalisation of the imported rules 
by domestic institutions. Motivated by the ‘logic of consequences’ rather than the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’, the domestic actors complied with EU conditions because of the main 
‘carrot’ on offer – the EU membership. The membership incentive was strong enough to 
outweigh the high adjustment costs and overcome domestic opposition even in highly sensitive 
issue areas such as the minority policy. However, the change in incentive structure and 
sanction mechanisms after the accession suggests that compliance can be undermined. The 
detailed qualitative analysis of post-accession compliance record of Slovakia in the two policy 
areas largely confirms this expectation. The paper found a significant degree of behavioural 
non-compliance and failure to institutionalise the adopted formal rules in practice. Moreover, 
even if operationalising ‘compliance’ as merely legislative transposition into domestic law, 
there are some (hidden) traces of legislative non-compliance too. The legislative framework on 
both minority rights and social policy adopted prior to accession was far from perfect: the laws 
contained vague regulations and left many ‘loopholes’ for problematic application and 
interpretation. The problems, however, are more visible if one takes a more comprehensive 
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view of ‘compliance’ including the institutionalisation and implementation stages. 
Institutionalisation of the adopted formal rules in both policy areas is quite weak: institutional 
structures such as the court system and specifically created functional bodies (such as the 
Centre for Human Rights) have been largely ineffective in ensuring post-accession compliance 
and enforcement of imported EU rules. 
The analysis revealed also some interesting variation in post-accession compliance 
record across the two policy areas. In the first four years or so after EU entry the 
implementation of the minority policy towards the largest minority group, the ethnic 
Hungarians, had some positive results and led to a steady improvement in the status and 
amount of legal rights. This can be contrasted with a general lack of positive changes in both 
institutionalisation and implementation of rules promoting rights of the Roma community in 
Slovakia. The main explanation for such variation in the outcomes lies in the realm of domestic 
politics: mainly, the configuration of domestic political forces and the presence of the 
epistemic community with relatively strong bargaining power (the SMK party as one of the 
ruling coalition partners and less nationalist centre-right coalition government under the 
Dzurinda leadership) vis-à-vis other main political players played a determining role in 
promoting and institutionalising rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. When the 
government changed in 2006, the domestic configuration of political forces and their 
preferences also changed leading to a significant policy reversal. The changed dynamics in 
implementing EU rules on social policy, and especially employment rights, in 2002-2006 can 
also be explained by the government’s ‘turn to neoliberalism’ and a constant push from the 
informal networks (including the liberally-oriented NGOs and the business community) to 
change the policy to a more employer- and business-friendly format at the expense the 
workers’ rights. The dynamics of compliance with EU social policy rules has changed again 
when the new leftist government came to power in 2006.  
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Thus, one can see that in order to have a more complete picture of post-accession 
compliance in CEE it is absolutely crucial to structure the analysis on the basis of two key 
points: first, the compliance should be perceived as a complex concept including both the 
formal transposition and enforcement (or application) stages; second, the preferences of key 
actors bargaining over new institutions and implementation of new EU rules should be taken 
into account when explaining the outcomes of post-accession compliance. In terms of the 
preliminary expectations formulated at the end of the theoretical section in the paper, the 
analysis revealed that the ‘empty shells’ outcome characterises fairly well Slovakia’s post-
accession compliance trends in both the minority policy and the social policy. The variation in 
outcomes with respect to institutionalisation and implementation of imported EU rules had to 
do less with the type of rules (acquis or non-acquis), but more with domestic configuration of 
the major political forces and informal networks, and their preferences supporting or opposing 
the new rules. Further comparative research should aim to identify bargaining patterns and 
different constellations of issue-specific veto players and non-state actors in other policy 
sectors and countries to further extend the theoretical approaches on post-accession compliance 
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